The organization of the lecture is as follows. The related work is introduced in section 2, in section 3 briefly introduces network model, assumptions and One-Way Hash key chain, the section 4 is the description of KCEFP, the security, and performance analysis of the new scheme are discussed in section 5 and 6, section 7 is the conclusion and further work.
II. RELATED WORK
In 2004, An interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data was proposed by Zhu et al [5] , in the scheme, to defend against false data injection attacks, at least t + 1 sensor nodes have to agree upon a report before it is sent to the base station, here the t is a security threshold based on the security requirements of the application under consideration and the network node density. Further, all the nodes that are involved in relaying the report to the base station authenticate the report in an interleaved, hop-by-hop fashion, any data change between two associated nodes was considered as false data injection. The scheme can guarantee that if no more than t nodes are compromised, the base station will detect any false data packets injected by the compromised sensors.
In [6] , A Statistical en-route filtering mechanism (SEF) was proposed by F. Ye et al to detect and drop false reports during the forwarding process. In SEF, a legitimate report is generated by multiple surrounding sensors, and the legitimate report is attached endorsement nodes' message authentication codes (MACs). As a report is forwarded through multiple hops toward the sink, each forwarding node verifies the correctness of the MACs carried in the report with certain probability and drops the report if an incorrect MAC is detected. However, due to its design strategy, only a few intermediate nodes have the ability to check the validity of forwarding messages.
In 2007, Vinod Shukla and Daji Qiao proposed a secure statistical scheme (SSTF) [7] , SSTF is able to distinguish transient data from false data in most scenarios, in the scheme, each sensor computes a statistical digest of the monitored phenomenon over a moving window of recent readings and reports this digest along with the current reading to CH. By utilizing the statistical digests to aid in decision making and data aggregation at the CH. But if only the current sensed readings are reported by individual sensors, it is very difficult to distinguish transient data from false data, and SSTF requires the CH to perform a series of carefully-designed inter-sensor tests on both readings and digests reported by individual sensors, which increases the burden of the CH.
Ren Kui et al proposed a security End-to-end data transient scheme (LEDS) [8] , in the LEDS, a location-aware end-to-end security framework is proposed, in which each node only stores a few secret keys and those secret keys are bound to the node's geographic location. This locationaware property successfully limits the impact of compromised nodes only to their vicinity without affecting end-to-end data security. LEDS could guarantee efficient en-route bogus data filtering and is highly robust against many know DoS attacks by one-to-many data delivery approach, but the scheme requires each node must know location information of the node.
Ozdemir.Suat et al proposed a data aggregation and authentication protocol (DAA) [9] , the DAA could provide false data detection and secure data aggregation against up to T compromised sensor nodes. To detect false data injected by a data aggregator while performing data aggregation, some neighboring nodes of the data aggregator (called monitoring nodes) also perform data aggregation and compute message authentication codes (MACs) for the aggregated data to enable their pair mates to verify the data later. DAA also provides data confidentiality as data are forwarded between data aggregators. To provide data confidentiality during data forwarding between every two consecutive data aggregators, the aggregated data are encrypted at data aggregators, and false data detection is performed over the encrypted data rather than the plain data. Whenever the verification of encrypted data fails at a forwarding node, the data are dropped immediately to minimize the waste of resources such as bandwidth and battery power due to false data injection.
Yu et al. proposes a grouping-based resilient statistical en-route filtering scheme (GRSEF) for filtering false data [10] . GRSEF divide sensor nodes into T groups, which ensure any position in the monitoring area can be covered simultaneously by T nodes from distinct groups with high probability, and GRSEF introduces a multi-axis division technique to tackle the threshold limitation without relying on the sink stationarity and routing mechanism. GRSEF efficiently avoids introducing redundant groups and achieves the independence on the sink stationarity and routing protocols, but each sensor node stores a large number of keys, and the adversary only need compromise small amount nodes which can make the security protocol failure.
In [11] , geographical information based false reports filtering scheme (GFFS) in sensor networks can modify the node ID list so that the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources of all the forwarding nodes, the adversary can modify the node ID list so that the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources of all the forwarding nodes.
III. NETWORK MODEL, ASSUMPTIONS AND ONE-WAY HASH KEY CHAIN a. Network Model
We consider that the wireless sensor network consists of a base station (BS) and a large amount of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are grouped into distinct clusters after deployment. There are many clustering algorithm in wireless sensor networks [18] [19] , we use the cluster algorithm similar to that used in scheme [19] . Once an event occurs in an area, it can be detected by many nodes in the cluster covering the area. We assume that the neighbor nodes can sense the same message. In each cluster, the cluster head (CH) collects the message receives from the detecting nodes and generates a final report, the final report is then forwarded to the base station.
b. Assumptions
We assume that nodes are limited in their storage, computational, and communication resource, the base station is not resource constrained, and is assumed to be uncompromised at all times. It is assumed that an adversary can launch many attacks. If a sensor node is compromised, all the information it holds will be known to the adversary, and the adversary can use the compromised node to inject false reports into the network, which will deceive the base station and deplete the resources of the forwarding nodes. The adversary can perform a replay attack by sending out multiple copies of an intercepted legitimate report. Furthermore the adversary can launch the identifiers (IDs) attack; the adversary can modify the node ID list so that the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources of all the forwarding nodes.
c. One-Way Hash key chain A one-way function H which maps an arbitrary length message M to a fixed-length hash value D,
it is a public function easy to compute but computationally infeasible to revert, Given M and H(M) it is hard to find a message M'≠M such that H(M')==H(M).
The one-way hash key chain [6] is constructed by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function H, on a random seed number R for m times. For example, if let K m =R, then We assume that the nodes send message to the base station according to the base station's query message. Since many notations are used in our proposed protocol, in order to easy to inquire, compare and reference, we list the notations used in proposed protocol in table 1. The system randomly selects a number ID i as the unique identity of the node i.
2) Each sensor node saves a secret key shared between the node i and base station.
3) Each sensor node saves a collision-resistant one-way hash function.
4) The system deploys the sensor nodes to the target area.
5) After deploying, the sensor nodes are grouped into clusters, and a cluster head (CH) is elected in each cluster.
c. Query from base station
When the base station wants to get some message from the cluster i, it sends a query message to the cluster head i as following:
1) The base station selects randomly a big prime R as K m from the finite field.
2) The base station computes the K m-1 = H(K m )=H 1 (R).
3 2) The CH i sends the RP and the query message Q to his member nodes i (i=1…n), n denotes the number of member nodes.
3) After receiving the message, each the member node i generates a report RP' according to the query message Q and checks if the RP' == RP, if yes, the node i calculates MAC i =E(K i,bs , RP), and sends the MAC i and the identity of the node i ID i to the CH i .
S i →CH i : < MAC i , ID i > 4) After collection at least t+1 endorsements of the report RP from his member nodes, the CH i randomly selects t endorsements form the received endorsements, and calculates SMAC= MAC CH ⊕ MAC 1 … ⊕ MAC t = E(K CHi,bs , RP) ⊕ E(K 1,bs , RP)… ⊕ E(K t,bs , RP). 5) Set m'=1, and comuptes MAC= E (K 0 , ID CHi ||ID 1 ||…||ID t ||SMAC).
6) The CH i generates report packet <(QUERYID, m', ID CHi , ID 1 ,…, ID t ), SMAC, MAC, E(K CHi,bs , RP||T')>, and sends this packet to the base station along the reversed query message path, when the packet is forwarded one time, set m'=m'+1. 
f. BS Verification
After receiving the report packet form the CH i , the BS will verify the valid of the report RP as following:
1) The BS decrypts the message E(K CHi,bs , RP||T') by the secret key K CHi,bs , gets RP and T'. If the T' is out of the reasonable ranges, BS will drop the report packet.
2) The BS looks up the secret keys K CHi,bs , K 1,bs ,…, and K t,bs according to the ID CHi , ID 1 ,…, and ID t , which shared between the node i and base station.
3) The BS computes SMAC'=E(K CHi,bs , RP) ⊕ E(K 1,bs , RP)… ⊕ E(K t,bs , RP) with the share key K CHi,bs , K 1,bs ,…, K t,bs between the nodes and the base station.
4) The BS checks if SMAC'= = SMAC, if yes, BS receives the report packet, otherwise, BS drops the report packet.
V. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS a. Data Confidentiality Zhiming Zhang, Xiaoyong Xiong and Jiangang Deng, A NOVEL KEY CHAIN-BASED EN-ROUTE FILTERING PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
When the outside adversary obtains the report packet of the CHi sends to the base station, it can get SMAC and E(KCHi,bs, RP||T2) , but it has no the secret share keys K1,bs,…, Kt,bs, and KCHi,bs, it can not decrypt the message E(KCHi,bs, RP||T') and SMAC, and can not obtain the report RP, so this scheme can ensures data confidentiality.
b. Resilience against false data injection attack
When the outside adversary obtains the report packet <(QUERYID, m', ID CHi , ID 1 ,…, ID t ), SMAC, MAC, E(K CHi,bs , RP||T')>, it can not modify any message of the report packet to deceive the base station, because it has no the secret share keys K 1,bs ,…, K t,bs , and K CHi,bs , between the nodes i, CH i and the base station.
If the adversary compromises less than t nodes, t denotes the number of the CH i member nodes.
The compromised node i can generate a false data MAC i ', and sends (MAC i ', ID i ) to CH i , the CH i will generate SMAC', and sends report packet to the base station, it will be detected after the base station carries out verification algorithm. 
VI. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS a. Storage Requirements
In this part, we show storage requirements. We assume that the base station has unlimited computation ability and storage, we do not consider the memory cost of the base station.
In our scheme, each sensor node must save the node's own identity ID bits, the length of hash value and the security key is 64bits, the storage requirements RS for a sensor node is RS=10+64+10+64=148Bits=18.5bytes.
In [5] , each nodes needs store the share key K u between node u and the base station, the share pair wise key K uv between nodes u and v, node u's authentication key K u a , and the id list of cluster acknowledgment. Let L ID , and t denote the length of a node identity and the node identifiers numbers in the id list. Let L key denotes the length of K u , K uv and K u a .The storage requirements RS' for a sensor node are: RS'= t*L ID + 3*L key , suppose the length of a node identity is 10 bits, the length of the security key is 64bits, the node identifiers numbers is 10, the storage requirements RS' for a sensor node is RS'=10*10+3*64=292Bits=36.5bytes.
In [8] , each nodes needs store two unique secret keys shared between the node and the sink and The requirement analysis shows that the storage requirement of our scheme is lower than others schemes.
b. Energy Consumption
In this part, we will analysis the energy consumption of our scheme and the other scheme. We use the analysis model similar to that used in scheme [6] . Let t denotes the number of the sensor nodes endorsing the reports, let L ID , L QUERYID , L m' , L M denote the length of the node identity, the QUERYID, the m' value and MAC, let L E denote the length of a report by encrypted. In our scheme, energy consumption of sensor nodes mainly is to receive and send the report packet. The format of the report packet is <(QUERYID, m', ID CHi , ID 1 ,…, ID t ), SMAC, MAC, E(K CHi,bs , RP||T')>. So, the length of a report packet is L= L QUERYID + L m + L ID *t +2*L M + L E . When a intermediate node receives a report packet from another node, a fabricated report packet will be drop after verifying, and the legitimate report packet will be forwarded, thus, the energy consumption in our scheme is E t =n*(L *(e r +e s )+e v )+m*(L*(e r )+e v ), where n, m denote the average number of hops and the number of fabricated report packet, the e r ,e s , denote the energy consumption of receiving and sending 1 byte report packet, the e v denotes the energy consumption of MAC computation to verify a report packet. Without our scheme, all the packet, include the legitimate and fabricated packet, will be forwarded to the base station along all the hops, let the L r =24bytes denotes the length of a regular report, therefore, the energy consumption without our scheme is E r = n* L r *(e r +e s )(1+m).
c. Simulation
We deployed randomly 2500 sensor nodes in an area of 100m×100m, it assumed that the sensors can not move after deploying. We set the number of fabricated report packet from 1 to 10, and let n=50, t=5, e r =12.5µJ, e s =16.25µJ, e v =15µJ, L QUERYID =10Bits, L m' =10Bits, L M =64Bits, L ID =10Bits, L E =64Bits. In figure 2 , it depicts the energy consumption for report packet forwarding with the number of fabricated report packet increasing with and without our scheme.
The figure2 also gives the result of SEF [6] with the number of fabricated report packet increasing.
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Figure 2. The energy consumption of SEF, our scheme and without our scheme
In figure2, it shows that our scheme is more efficient in energy savings than SEF with the number of fabricated report packet increasing, and it shows that our scheme starts to save energy when the amount of fabricated report packet exceeds the one report packet, and with the number of fabricated report packet increasing, the energy savings significantly increasing also. For example, when m=3, our scheme saves 1-E t /E r ≌64.4% of energy than the scheme without using our scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a false data injection-resilient security routing protocol based on oneway key chain and different operation. We introduced a lightweight Encryption system one-way key chain which is applied in resource constrained wireless sensor networks. Each en-route nodes can verify the report packet through checking the validity of the one-way hash key value, if the hash key value is invalid, the false report packet can be filtered out immediately. The security and
